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Property	Rights	and	Social	Norms	for	Managing	the	Commons	
		
	
1. Introduction	
In	many	of	 the	developing	countries,	dependency	on	natural	 resources	 is	 significantly	
high.	From	peasants	to	fishermen	and	farmers,	all	of	them	earn	their	living	from	the	utility	
of	renewable	natural	resources	such	as	water,	air,	farming	land,	forest,	plants,	animals	
and	grazing	areas	(Heltberg,	2002).	Given	the	importance	of	natural	resources	for	many	
of	the	developing	countries,	it	is	important	to	address	the	issues	like	the	tragedy	of	the	
commons,	climatic	change,	pollution,	and	unsustainable	usage	of	natural	resources	which	
might	lead	to	rural	poverty,	food	insecurity,	and	high	rural-urban	migration	(Heltberg,	
2002).	Among	the	major	factors	mentioned	above,	this	essay	will	focus	on	the	tragedy	of	
the	 commons,	 property	 rights,	 and	 natural	 resource	 management	 in	 developing	
countries.	
	
2. Tragedy	of	the	Commons	
Before	elaborating	on	property	rights	and	natural	resources	management,	it	is	important	
to	learn	about	the	tragedy	of	the	commons.	As	said	by	Hardin	(1968),	the	tragedy	of	the	
commons	is	overexploitation	of	the	common	resources	that	lack	ownership.	He	argues	
that	when	everyone	owns	the	resources	and	there	is	a	 lack	of	defined	property	rights,	
nobody	will	conserve	the	resources	for	future	use	and	externalities	of	the	future	scarcity	
will	 have	 destructive	 consequences	 for	 the	 whole	 ecosystem.	 His	 claims	 were	 also	
supported	by	the	collective	action	theory	of	Oslon	(1965),	where	he	describes	that	the	
common-pool	 resources	 will	 face	 the	 free	 riders’	 problem	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 their	
utilization	or	investment	for	future	preservation.	
	
In	the	Tragedy	of	the	Commons,	Hardin	(1968)	also	stated	that	as	the	population	grows	
exponentially,	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 available	 goods	 per	 capita	 would	 decrease.	 He	
recognizes	that	if	the	next	generations	are	not	aware	or	deliberately	deny	the	fact	that	
resources	available	in	the	world	are	indeed	finite,	misery	will	increase,	as	spaces	shrink,	
and	 resources	 are	 overexploited.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 author	 argues	 that	 the	world	 can	
provide	only	for	a	limited	number	of	population	and	he	gives	two	reasons	to	prove	it:	1)	
he	refers	to	Neumann	and	Morgenstern	(1947)	and	their	utility	theory	where	it	 is	not	
possible	 to	maximize	 for	 two	during	 the	same	period;	2)	all	organisms	need	a	certain	
amount	of	energy	to	survive	which	requires	about	1600	kilocalories	per	day	and	anything	
above	 that	will	be	defined	as	work	and	 leisure.	Therefore,	maximizing	 the	population	
would	mean	 to	 bring	 calories	 close	 to	 zero,	 to	meet	 everyone's	 basic	 needs,	 without	
eliminating	any	kind	of	enjoyment.	
	
Hardin	(1968)	in	light	of	Adam	Smith's	"invisible	hand''	theory,	explains	that	if	humans	
are	making	 individual	 rational	 choices	 to	 continue	 the	 reproduction	 and	maintaining	
population	 growth	 at	 its	 optimum	 level,	 then	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 government	
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intervention.	 However,	 if	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 then	 it	 is	 important	 to	 question	 our	
“individual	 freedoms”	 and	 allow	 some	 interventions	 to	maintain	 the	population	 at	 its	
optimum	rate.	
	
According	to	Kolb	(2019),	15	out	of	the	20	poorest	countries	with	a	GDP	per	capita	below	
5,000	USD	are	considered	to	have	the	fastest-growing	populations.	The	top	5	countries	
whose	population	is	projected	to	grow	by	49%	on	average	during	2018-2030	are	Niger,	
Sao	Tome,	and	Principe,	Angola,	 the	Democratic	Republic	of	 the	Congo	and	Equatorial	
Guinea.	This	effect	of	growing	population	“can	increase	pressure	on	the	land	and	natural	
resources,	as	evidenced	in	places	such	as	Chad	and	Burundi”	(Kolb,	2019).	
	
But	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	does	not	limit	itself	to	the	population	problem,	it	also	
analyzes	 how	 certain	 individual	 freedoms—motivated	 by	 the	 self-interest—cause	
problems	 of	 pollution	 that	 end	 up	 harming	 the	 environment	 and	 constraining	 public	
health.	An	example	of	this	is	the	residuals	into	the	air	and	water	that	factories	release	as	
they	produce,	without	enforcement	laws	to	prevent	it	or	to	revert	the	damage.	Hardin	
(1968)	 mentions	 that	 a	 person	 using	 purely	 his	 rationality	 will	 decide	 to	 discharge	
polluted	waste	into	the	commons	instead	of	removing	contaminants	first	since	the	cost	
of	the	first	option	is	much	less	than	the	second	one.		
	
What	is	then	the	alternative	to	stop	pollution?	Since	air	and	water	are	common	goods	that	
are	non-excludable	but	highly	rival,	 it	results	challenging	to	define	boundaries	to	limit	
their	usage.	In	this	sense,	Hardin	(1968)	believed	that	there	are	other	ways	to	prevent	its	
overexploitation,	 such	 as	 “coercive	 laws	 or	 taxing	 devices	 that	make	 it	 cheaper	 for	 the	
polluter	to	treat	his	pollutants	than	to	discharge	them	untreated.’’	This	is	the	main	reason	
why	Hardin	(1968)	considered	that	private	property	is	the	most	effective	tool	to	prevent	
resources	to	be	exhausted.		
	
3. Property	Rights	Enforcement	to	Overcome	the	Tragedy	of	the	Commons	
According	to	Anderson	&	Huggins	(2003),	“property	rights	are	the	rules	of	the	game	that	
determine	who	gets	to	do	what	and	who	must	compensate	whom	if	damages	occur."	They	
further	 add	 that	 property	 rights	 govern	 access	 to	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 assets.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 mention	 that	 when	 the	 property	 rights	 are	 effectively	 enforced:	 1)	
cooperation	will	 replace	 conflicts;	 2)	property	owners	will	 start	bargaining	with	each	
other;	3)	gains	from	trade	will	increase;	4)	and	it	will	eventually	encourage	civility	and	
economic	progress.	Some	of	the	key	characteristics	of	the	property	rights,	which	might	
fully	or	partially	apply	to	different	categories	of	properties	are	1)	the	right	to	use	an	asset;	
2)	the	right	to	exclude	others	from	using	it;	3)	the	right	to	transfer	asset	to	others;	4)	
grants	the	owner	full	control	over	the	asset.		
	
According	to	Heltberg	(2002),	property	rights	can	be	distinguished	into	4	categories:	
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• Open	 Access	 Property:	 These	 types	 of	 property	 rights	 refer	 to	 resources	 that	 are	
lacking	 ownership	 and	 control.	 Hence,	 they	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 overexploitation,	
especially	when	the	population	density	increases	or	the	resources	are	economically	
valuable.	For	example,	overfishing	in	the	international	water.	
	
• Common	Property:	These	types	of	property	rights	refer	to	resources	that	are	under	
communal	 ownership	 and	 access	 rules	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 community	 members.	
Common	 property	 has	 distinct	 advantages	 of	 collective	 equity	 and	 insurance,	
nevertheless,	the	problem	of	the	free-rider	has	to	be	handled	through	communal	rules	
and	regulations.	A	good	example	of	common	property	is	ownership	of	a	water	well.		
	
• State	Property:	These	types	of	property	rights	refer	to	resources	that	are	under	the	
ownership	of	state	and	the	government	decides	on	their	access	and	conservation	rules.	
If	 the	 government	 fail	 to	 effectively	 enforce	 the	 rules	 of	 state	 property,	 then	 they	
become	de	facto	open	access	or	private	property.	For	example,	many	of	the	forests	are	
state	property,	who	is	responsible	for	ownership	and	conservation	rules.	
	
• Private	 Property:	These	 types	 of	 property	 rights	 refer	 to	 resources	 that	 are	 under	
private	ownership.	The	ideal	type	of	private	property	rights	is	the	one	that	gives	the	
right	 of	 possession,	 transfer,	 usage,	 change,	 and	 destruction	 of	 the	 asset.	 A	 good	
example	of	private	property	is	the	ownership	of	a	land,	car,	and	other	assets.	
	
After	 knowing	 the	 alternative	 to	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 and	 different	 types	 of	
property	rights,	we	would	like	to	take	a	look	into	the	provision	of	property	rights	and	
how	 it	was	perceived	 in	 the	past.	Given	 that,	 this	 essay	will	 discuss	 the	provisions	of	
property	rights	from	a	philosophical,	historical,	and	economic	point	of	view.	
	
3.1	Philosophical	Evolution	of	the	Property	Rights	
Considering	the	importance	of	property	rights	for	society,	they	became	more	debatable	
to	the	scholars	on	a	philosophical	level.	As	Rand	(1964)	described	the	right	to	property	
in	her	famous	collection	of	essays:	“the	right	to	life	is	the	source	of	all	rights—and	the	right	
to	 property	 is	 their	 only	 implementation.	 Without	 property	 rights,	 no	 other	 rights	 are	
possible.”	Now	that	we	want	to	discuss	property	rights	from	a	philosophical	point	of	view,	
we	would	like	to	travel	back	in	time	and	see	what	philosophers	reflected	on	this	topic	
during	 the	 course	 of	 history.	 To	 start	with	 Plato,	 in	 his	 vision	 of	 an	 ideal	 society,	 he	
supported	the	provision	of	common	property	ownership	and	prohibited	the	rulers	of	the	
city	to	possess	individual	property	to	mitigate	conflicts	of	interest	and	disputes	over	the	
ownership	 of	 resources	 (Anderson,	 2003).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Aristotle’s	 politics	
challenged	Plato’s	vision	and	he	doubted	that	the	society	would	be	in	a	perfect	state	if	the	
property	was	owned	by	the	commons	because	a	property	shared	by	a	large	number	of	
citizens	would	have	fewer	resources	granted	for	their	maintenance.	That’s	why	Aristotle	
preferred	private	ownership	of	the	property	over	common.		
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Aristotle’s	vision	was	also	followed	by	early	catholic	church	theorists	such	as	“Thomas	
Aquinas”,	who	agreed	that	common	ownership	neither	promotes	efficiency	nor	harmony.	
He	also	emphasized	that	it	is	important	for	humans	to	feel	the	security	that	is	provided	
by	the	self-ownership	of	property—to	reach	spiritually	(Anderson,	2003).		
	
By	the	passage	of	time	and	rise	of	Protestantism,	enlightenment	scholars	such	as	John	
Locke	started	to	examine	the	property	rights	and	agreements	between	the	government	
and	other	stakeholders.	He	argued	that	the	concept	of	property	rights	existed	long	ago,	
with	or	without	government,	and	that	these	rights	were	derived	from	the	natural	rights	
of	one’s	own	life	and	freedom	of	choices.	His	definition	of	property	rights	included	the	
right	to	use	them	and	retain	their	gain.	That	was	mainly	the	justification	for	government	
existence	and	how	it	is	important	to	protect	these	basic	rights.		
	
In	the	early	stages	of	the	industrial	revolution,	Adam	Smith	introduced	“The	wealth	of	
Nations”	in	1776,	where	he	was	highly	influenced	by	Locke’s	perspective	of	looking	into	
the	property	rights	within	a	 larger	system	of	natural	rights.	Adam	Smith	considered	a	
cycle	of	rules,	where	private	property	created	a	role	for	the	government	to	protect	them,	
and	 in	 return,	 new	 properties	 would	 be	 created	 in	 the	 society.	 This	 protective	
relationship	 between	 government	 and	 property	 determines	 the	 wealth	 of	 nations	
(Anderson,	2003).	
	
3.2	Historical	Evolution	of	the	Property	Rights	
During	 the	 course	 of	 history,	 property	 rights	 have	 been	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 existence,	
because	 humans	 were	 following	 the	 desire	 for	 orders	 and	 ownership.	 According	 to	
Anderson	 (1994),	 property	 rights	 were	 truly	 understood	 by	 pre-and-post	 Columbian	
Indians,	hence,	they	established	institutional	rules	to	define	who	has	the	right	to	own	land	
and	possess	personal	property.	These	rights	became	hereditary	to	the	Mahican	Indians	
and	helped	them	to	save	their	rights	in	the	fertile	lands	among	the	river.	These	protection	
lessons	gave	 the	Hopi	Tribes	 the	 idea	 to	mark	 their	 territories	by	boundary	stones	 to	
protect	their	rights.		
	
The	 concept	 of	 property	 rights	 gained	 importance	 during	 the	 agrarian	 lifestyle	 that	
characterized	the	ancient	Greeks.	Owning	a	land	became	an	important	asset	for	obtaining	
full	freedom	because	farmers	would	not	be	bound	to	pay	tribute	to	their	aristocrats.	On	
the	other	hand,	if	a	Greek	lost	possession	of	his	land,	he	would	also	lose	his	citizenship	
(Anderson,	2003).	
	
In	the	sixteenth	century,	the	idea	of	property	rights	became	law	in	Britain	and	then	in	the	
United	 States	 constitution,	 which	 led	 to	 potential	 trade	 development	 and	 economic	
growth	(Anderson,	2003).	Later	on,	in	the	nineteenth	century,	the	communist	manifesto	
of	 1848	 by	 Frederick	 Engels	 and	 Karl	 Marx	 called	 for	 the	 cancellation	 of	 private	
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ownership,	 as	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 product	 of	 capitalism	 that	was	 destroying	 social	
equality.	 However,	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	Wall	 of	 Berlin,	 the	
majority	of	the	countries	once	again	endorsed	the	importance	of	private	property	as	the	
key	to	growth	and	prosperity.	Since	the	1980s,	many	of	the	countries	directed	resources	
towards	the	privatization	of	industries	and	natural	resources	(Anderson,	2003).	
	
3.3	Economic	Evolution	of	the	Property	Rights	
When	 property	 rights	 knowledge	 gained	 certain	 maturity	 among	 scholars,	 further	
theories	and	explanations	were	developed	on	how	property	rights	fostered	productivity	
and	economic	growth.	Douglass	North,	who	was	a	Nobel	laureate,	argues	that	“economic	
growth	occurs	when	secure	property	rights	exist	to	make	it	worthwhile	to	invest	in	socially	
productive	activity.”	
	
The	modern	economic	theory	analyzes	how	individuals	make	choices	according	to	their	
preferences	and	describe	four	main	principles	for	the	guidance	of	property	rights,	which	
can	be	described	as	follows	(Anderson,	2003):	
	
1) ‘’Individuals	 make	 choices	 under	 conditions	 of	 scarcity’’.	 People	 make	 decisions	
according	to	the	resources	available,	where	the	usage	of	one	resource	cannot	be	used	
for	a	different	purpose.	
2) ‘’Individuals	 act	 rationally	 to	 pursue	 their	 self-interests’’.	 Since	 individuals	 try	 to	
maximize	 their	well-being,	 they	will	only	advocate	enforcing	property	 rights	 if	 the	
outcomes	for	doing	so	are	higher	than	the	investment	made	for	their	maintenance.			
3) ‘’Individuals	 will	 compete	 for	 control	 of	 scarce	 resources’’.	 When	 seeking	 for	 their	
maximization,	individuals	will	try	to	control	as	many	resources	as	possible,	adapting	
to	the	rules	of	the	game.	
4) ‘’Well-specified	and	transferable	property	rights	encourage	gains	from	trade’’.	Having	
private	 ownership	 of	 an	 asset,	 will	 discourage	 the	 race	 of	 different	 individuals	 to	
obtain	it	and	exploit	it	and	on	the	contrary,	will	incentivize	the	owner	to	invest	in	its	
maintenance	and	sustainable	usage.	
	
4. Critique	to	the	Provision	of	Property	Rights		
According	 to	 Lynham	 and	 Leibbrandt	 (2018),	 when	 property	 rights	 solutions	 are	
implemented	 in	 practice,	 the	 government	 typically	 tries	 to	 allocate	 the	 total	 property	
rights	according	to	the	socially	efficient	targets.	Namely,	the	total	monetary	gains	from	
property	rights	should	be	socially	desirable	and	efficient.	The	authors	further	argue	that	
property	rights	should	be	tradable	so	that	they	can	reach	the	hands	of	those	who	value	
them	most,	but	they	also	accept	the	fact	that	if	the	total	economic	outcome	of	property	
rights	are	equal	 to	 its	socially	desirable	 target	and	they	are	perfectly	enforced,	 then	 it	
does	not	matter	if	the	provision	of	property	rights	can	be	tradable	or	not.		
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Lynham	and	Leibbrandt	 (2018)	also	argue	 that,	 in	practice,	property	rights	are	rarely	
perfectly	 enforced	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 government	monitoring	 and	 ignorance	 of	 the	 social	
norms.	These	norms	are	unenforced	rules	of	behaviors	that	are	practiced	by	individuals	
based	on	common	beliefs	in	a	given	situation.	Due	to	a	lack	of	effective	monitoring	and	
detection	mechanism,	individuals	are	presented	with	numerous	opportunities	to	breach	
property	rights,	nevertheless,	social	norms	can	prevent	any	breach	regularly	due	to	the	
common	understanding	of	the	individuals.	Given	that,	the	authors	refer	to	the	findings	of	
Tyler	 (1990)	 and	 Ellickson	 (1991),	 who	 emphasized	 that	 the	mixture	 of	 government	
monitoring	and	social	norms	enforced	property	rights	effectively	and	efficiently.	Besides,	
Heltberg	(2002)	argues	that	simple	interventions	by	the	government	and	donor	agencies	
cannot	achieve	the	desired	outcome	and	thus,	there	should	be	a	detailed	understanding	
of	social	norms	and	local	institutions.	This	discussion	brings	up	the	question	if	there	is	a	
need	for	government	intervention	to	enforce	property	rights	for	common-pool	resources,	
or	if	it	can	be	possible	to	follow	a	system	of	social	norms	designed	within	a	community.	
To	elaborate	on	this,	we	will	discuss	the	principles	of	Ostrom	as	following.	
	
5. Ostrom’s	Principles	to	Manage	the	Commons	
According	 to	 Ostrom	 (1990),	 the	 term	 “common-pool	 resource’’	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	
system,	either	natural	or	fabricated,	that	provides	non-excludable	goods	-but	rival-	in	a	
large	 scale,	 and	 its	 components	are	 the	 ‘’resource	 system’’	 and	 the	 ‘’flow	of	 resources	
units’’.		
Resource	system	refers	to	the	set	of	elements	that	make	it	possible	to	produce	a	good	
under	appropriate	conditions	and	without	exhausting	“the	stock	or	the	resource	system	
itself’’	(Ostrom,	1990).	As	resource	systems,	we	can	identify	fishing	waters,	parking	lots,	
grazing	areas,	irrigation	systems,	and	any	other	kind	of	system	where	it	is	not	intended	
to	charge	a	marginal	cost	for	the	extra	usage,	as	it	would	result	in	inefficient.			
On	the	other	hand,	resources	units	are	the	total	amount	of	units	appropriated	from	the	
resource	system.	As	examples	we	can	mention	the	total	kilograms	of	fish	harvested,	the	
number	of	times	a	car	was	parked	in	the	parking	lot,	the	food	consumed	by	animals	in	the	
grazing	areas	or	the	total	amount	of	water	used	from	the	irrigation	system.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 difference	 between	 resource	 systems	 and	 resource	
units	because	the	first	ones	can	be	non-excludable,	but	the	latter	ones,	once	appropriated	
by	one	person	or	firm,	can	no	longer	belong	to	someone	else.	
In	this	sense,	property	rights	supporters	believe	that	under	a	system	where	no	person	
can	 be	 excluded,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 commons	will	 be	 heavily	 harmed.	Moreover,	
individuals	 are	 rational	 and	 compete	 over	 resources,	 which	 are	 scarce	 and	 limited	
(Anderson	&	Huggins,	2003).	Such	scarcity	presents	an	issue	for	the	sustainability	of	the	
common	 shared	—or	 common-pool	 resources—	 in	 a	 community,	where	 depletion	 or	
tragedy	of	the	commons	is	the	main	threat.	In	this	sense,	communities	must	develop	a	
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system	 to	 avoid	 overexploitation	 of	 resources	 and	 to	 protect	 their	 long-term	
sustainability.	
In	this	context,	Ostrom	(1990),	presents	a	set	of	eight	principles	as	a	suggestion	to	try	to	
address	 the	 issue	 previously	 raised	 suggesting	 how	 commons	 can	 be	 governed	
sustainably	and	equitably	 in	a	 community	 to	maximize	 the	use	and	 to	avoid	potential	
depletion.	 These	 principles	 are	 proposed	 based	 on	 her	 lifetime	 study	 on	 how	
communities	succeed	or	fail	at	managing	common-pool	(finite)	resources	such	as	grazing	
land,	forests,	and	irrigation	waters.	
The	principles	are	as	follows:	
1.	Clearly	define	boundaries:	To	determine	who	has	the	right	to	withdraw	resource	units	
from	 the	 common-pool	 resources.	This	 is	 the	 first	 step	 to	exclude	 from	outsiders	and	
secure	that	benefits	are	not	reaped	by	others	who	have	not	contributed.	
2.	Congruence	between	appropriation	and	provision	rules	and	local	conditions:	The	rules	
must	be	in	congruence	with	local	conditions	restricting	time,	place,	technology,	and/or	
quantity	of	resource	units,	required	labor,	material,	and/or	money.	This	helps	to	account	
for	the	perseverance	of	these	common-pool	resources.	
3.	Most	 individuals	 affected	 by	 the	 operational	 rules	 can	 participate:	 Individuals	who	
result	affected	by	the	operational	rules	should	be	able	to	participate	in	modifying	them	
based	on	 local	 circumstances,	 to	better	 fit	 them	 to	 the	 specific	 characteristics	of	 their	
setting.	
4.	 Develop	 a	 community-based	 monitoring	 system:	 To	 monitors	 and	 actively	 audit	
common-pool	resources	conditions	and	appropriators'	behavior.		
5.	 Graduated	 sanctions:	Appropriators	 who	 violate	 operational	 rules	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
assessed	graduated	sanctions	(depending	on	the	seriousness	and	context	of	the	offense)	
by	other	appropriators,	by	officials	accountable	to	these	appropriators,	or	by	both.	
6.	 Conflict-resolution	mechanisms:	 Low-cost	 mechanism	 for	 discussing	 and	 resolving	
conflicts	that	constitute	an	infraction.	These	can	be	quite	informal.	
7.	Minimal	recognition	of	rights	to	organize:	The	rights	of	appropriators	and	the	rules	
should	not	be	challenged	by	external	governmental	authorities	to	sustain	rule-governed	
common-pool	resources	over	the	long-run.	
8.	Nested	enterprises:	Additional	principle	for	common-pool	resources	that	form	part	of	
larger	 systems.	 Ensure	 appropriation,	 provision,	 monitoring,	 enforcement,	 conflict	
resolution,	 and	 governance	 activities	 in	 multiple	 layers	 of	 nested	 enterprises.	
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Establishing	 rules	 at	 one	 level,	 without	 rules	 at	 the	 other	 levels,	 will	 produce	 an	
incomplete	system	that	may	not	endure	over	the	long	run.	
As	 Ostrom	 mentions	 in	 her	 book,	 this	 proposal	 is	 not	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 or	 “necessary”	
conditions	to	achieve	the	success	of	a	common-pool	resource,	but	rather	a	suggestion	is	
given	that	these	principles	are	still	quite	speculative.	They	are	based	on	two	assumptions:	
(1)	that	the	individuals	live	side	by	side	and	say	farm	plots	year	after	year;	and	(2)	they	
expect	their	children	and	grandchildren	to	inherit	the	lands.	
The	 idea	behind	 these	principles	 lays	 in	 the	concept	 that	human	beings	are	“beings	of	
habits”.	 If	 communities	 do	 not	 establish	 rules	 to	 develop	 a	 “proper”	 behavior,	 then	
families	are	likely	to	reap	the	benefits.	Without	different	rules,	appropriators	could	not	
take	advantage	of	the	positive	features	of	a	local	CPR	or	avoid	potential	pitfalls	that	might	
be	encountered.		
6. Conclusion	
As	we	learned,	developing	countries	are	highly	dependent	on	natural	resources,	and	thus,	
the	 utility	 and	 maintenance	 of	 those	 resources	 are	 vital	 for	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	
ecosystem	 and	 economic	 development.	 We	 have	 also	 discussed	 that	 in	 developing	
countries,	social	norms	are	dominant	for	the	provision	of	common	goods	and	this	puts	
them	 prone	 to	 the	 tragedy	 of	 commons.	 Nevertheless,	 we	 elaborate	 on	 alternative	
strategies	like	property	rights	and	the	provision	of	government	intervention	to	overcome	
the	tragedy	of	commons,	but	strong	dominance	of	social	norms	and	lack	of	government	
monitoring	often	lead	to	failure	of	private	property	rights	laws.	Given	that,	we	discussed	
Ostrom´s	 (1990)	 principles	 which	 provide	 a	 set	 of	 recommendations	 that	 go	 beyond	
property	 rights	 provision.	 This	 list	 of	 recommendations	 should	 be	 developed	 within	
communities,	 taking	into	account	the	different	stakeholders	 involved	in	the	process	of	
managing	 the	commons,	providing	monitoring	 systems,	 conflict	 resolution	spaces	and	
adaptability	of	the	rules	according	to	the	local	conditions	to	guarantee	an	efficient	and	
inclusive	governability	of	common-pool	resources.	
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